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Abstract 
This article examines how Edith Stein’s philosophical theory of empathy informs not only her scholarly discourse, 
but also the decision to dedicate her life to others. It first explicates the primary tenets of her theory, situating them 
within the context of early phenomenology as inspired by Edmund Husserl’s writings. It then chronologically 
charts those personal events that best display her efforts to put into praxis its principles. From being a volunteer 
nurse aiding the wounded during World War I to comforting those being sent to the concentration camps during 
Hitler’s regime, she continually privileges an empathetic awareness to understand those factors affecting the 
other’s state of mind and instill a sense of dignity that betters his or her person. The interlacing of these experiences 
underpins her conversion from Judaism to Christianity as well as a deep-seated desire to forge a meaningful 
connection with others. A concerted attentiveness to another’s beliefs and needs, whether they are intellectual, 
emotional, or spiritual, depicts the kind of affection that she exemplified on a daily basis. 
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Edith Stein’s Empathy 
The story of Edith Stein is a remarkable one. Its narrative centers upon her participation in two dominant 
religions—Judaism and Catholicism—as well as in a burgeoning field of philosophy that transforms the 
epistemological landscape, namely phenomenology. Her devotion to the thought subtending these spiritual and 
academic institutions reverberates to this day. As a victim of the Holocaust, she sacrificed everything for her 
religious heritage, thus becoming a representative of the tragedy inflicted upon her people. As a Catholic convert, 
she sought to exercise the virtues of compassion and charity, promoting human dignity in the most forsaken places. 
And, as a philosopher, she wrote a seminal text on the operation and purpose of empathy.1 The interlacing of these 
experiences underscores a deep-seated desire to forge a valued connection with others. Faith conjoined with 
phenomenological tenets leads her to reject the idea that human behavior and its expressions simply possess the 
potential to reveal something significant about that person, relying upon the intellect to ascribe it meaning. Rather, 
her convictions prompt her to exercise a concerted attentiveness discloses another’s motivations, beliefs, and 
needs. Whether intellectual, emotional, or spiritual, her affection epitomizes the kind of care that can be put into 
praxis and ultimately transcends mundane concerns. 
 
While many biographies chart the seemingly eclectic details of her life and many scholarly articles examine the 
profundity of her philosophical acumen, I would like to bridge these two related but distinct facets of her life to 
show that her tenets of empathy find fruition most fully in real-life experiences.2 Her academic writings coupled 
 
Notes 
Note 1    Stein was the second woman in German history to receive a doctorate in  
   philosophy. See Antonio Calcagno, “Assistant and/or Collaborator? Edith  
   Stein’s Relationship to Edmund Husserl’s Ideen II” in Contemplating Edith  
   Stein: A Collection of Essays, ed. Joyce Avrech Berkman (Notre Dame, IN:  
   University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), 263. 
Note  2   Waltraud, Herbstrith, Edith Stein: A Biography. trans. Bernard Bonowitz (San  
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1985); Elisa Magrì and Dermot Moran, Empathy,    
Sociality, and Personhood: Essays on Edith Stein’s Phenomenological  
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with a deep religiousness refine her belief in the value of others, and the decision to champion this principle 
transforms her thought from an abstract to a pragmatic endeavor which betters both her person and those who 
come into contact with her. Expounding upon her view, Alastair MacIntrye writes: “Empathetic awareness allows 
us to understand others in the same way. . . . And just as in the case of certain others we find ourselves, after we 
have become aware through iterated empathy of how they view us.”1 Making the effort to align our thoughts and 
feelings with another generates a positive rapport that allows us to realize our potential as human beings. 
 
Before discussing how Stein makes this realization active in her daily life, I would first like to explicate the primary 
tenets of her philosophy. Essentially, empathy increases the means to apprehend the extent of our possibilities. It 
engenders self-knowledge. Seeing ourselves as an “object” from the other’s perception reveals a facet of our person 
that, without this experience, would remain beyond our grasp.2 This insight “is foreign to the natural standpoint, 
and it is empathy that occasions it.”3 We learn how to exercise more capably not only those talents and skills that 
we already rely upon, but also those that, up to that point, have remained hidden from our view. Its reflexivity 
produces an attentiveness of how to utilize different avenues of knowing. Consider watching another person push 
aside his fear for self-preservation and run into a burning building to rescue a child crying out in fear. This event 
would cause the observer to look inside and determine if he could perform a similar heroic act. Adopting another’s 
perspective thus encourages us to discover and ponder those possibilities that we have yet to consider. It is, as 
Sarah Borden writes, where “I become real to myself.”4 
 
An empathetic embrace reveals a horizon of unfolding of meaning that enlightens the observer of another’s state 
of mind and makes him an active participant in the experience. By assessing and even reciprocating an affect 
similar to another’s emotional expression, the individual can determine more accurately what comprises the other’s 
motivations and intentions. This continually expanding perception allows one to become more fully aware of what 
he or she values above all else.5 She claims in her later writings that this is a distinct human power that enables 
one to fashion a harmonious connection with others. 
 
But human souls are capable, by virtue of their free spirituality, of opening themselves in loving self-giving to one 
another and of receiving one another into their own selves—never, to be sure, as completely as is the case with a 
soul that abide in God, but in some greater or smaller measure. And this receiving is not merely a knowing 
comprehension which leaves the object [Gegenstand] standing by itself at a distance and is thus of small 




Investigations (New York: Springer Publishing, 2017). 
Note 3    Alastair MacIntyre, Edith Stein: A Philosophical Prologue 1913-1922 (Lanham,  
   MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 86. 
Note 4     Edith Stein, On the Problem of Empathy, trans. Waltraut Stein (Washington,  
    D.C.: ICS Publications, 1989), 88. 
Note 5     Stein, Problem of Empathy, 89. 
Note 6     Sarah Borden, Edith Stein (London: Continuum, 2003), 29. 
Note 7     For a discussion of Stein’s view that empathetic acts engender self-knowledge,  
    see Sarah Borden Sharkey, Thine Own Self: Individuality in Edith Stein’s Later    
    Writings (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 121. 
  Note 8      Edith Stein, Finite and Eternal Being, trans. Kurt F. Reinhardt (Washington,  
       D.C.: ICS Publications, 2002), 514. 
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The very design of our creation empowers us to enter into another’s mind, use this knowledge selflessly, and 
express a genuine affection for that person. Although the understanding conveyed and reciprocated may not be as 
complete as when acquired in God’s presence, empathy provides a penetrating insight into what is actual and what 
is possible. Its limitations underscore the asymmetry between them, thus ensuring that one does not lose his sense 
of self within the other. Stein also claims that grace is necessary for self-understanding, for it takes the bandages 
off our eyes and “initiates the future fulfillment of the original ordination of the natural being of people.”1 The 
effort to apprehend the epistemic value of this interpersonal exchange simultaneously reveals a heightened ability 
to know others and a dependence upon God. Empathy, therefore, is not some casual or passive response to 
another’s actions or emotional reactions. Rather, it demands a keen awareness of what that moment says about 
oneself in relation to that person. 
 
With this in mind, explicating its operation takes on an added significance. It is not some theoretical exercise 
designed to advance academic scholarship, but enables one to realize how to utilize most effectively the influx of 
information conveyed by that experience. Superseding inference and speculation, direct, unmediated experience 
possesses an insight that transcends the quotidian concerns facially expressed by another’s behavior. Whether 
through facial or bodily movements, it elevates one’s consciousness to grasp the import of these actions, for they 
hold an intrinsic psychological significance. Using the example of a blush, Stein claims that it does not signify an 
emotion like shame or embarrassment, but actually contains significance in itself. For her, “meaning and symbol 
have something in common which forces them both to be called ‘expression’ repeatedly. Together they constitute 
the unity of an object.”2 Recognizing this relation and utilizing our past knowledge of what constitutes this 
behavior makes the blushing intelligible.3 The confluence of the cognitive and affective in explaining this moment 
establishes the other as the center of reference. As a result, Stein claims that “An action is a unity of intelligibility 
or of meaning because of its component experiences have an experienceable connection.”4 
 
By having to assess the experience’s intelligibility, the observer recognizes this as a genuinely original 
phenomenon. It exists solely between them, distinguishing the disparity of their roles. Properly aligning one’s 
thoughts and feelings involves far more than an impulsive reaction. It is a conscious mode of knowing that reveals 
how the two perspectives differ intrinsically. That the experiences are qualitatively different attests to the fact that 
each one is a minded individual who can respond freely to the other’s actions. Even though empathy affirms the 
reality of the other’s experience and the psychological inimitability underlying the behavior, it cannot penetrate 
fully his psychic life. It is in principle inaccessible to direct perception.5 A sharp delineation, therefore, exists 
between the act of experiencing and the content experienced. Empathy is, as Marianne Sawicki explains, “an act 
 
Note 9      Stein, Finite and Eternal Being, 526-7. 
Note 10    Stein, Problem of Empathy, 81. 
Note 11    Eugene Cassirer’s line of reasoning follows the same vein when he writes, \      “Instead of 
asking by what processes of logical inference or of aesthetic  
     projection the physical becomes psychical, it must follow perception back to  
     the point where it is not a perception of things but purely a perception of  
     expression, and where, accordingly, it is inside and outside in one” (Cassirer,  
     The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms III [New Haven: Yale University Press,  
     1957], 84). 
Note 12    Stein, Problem of Empathy, 84. 
Note 13    For a similar line of argumentation, see Edmund Husserl, Analysen zur passive  
     Synthesis: Aus Vorlesungs und Forschungsmanuskripten, 1918-1926, ed. M.  
     Fleischer, Husserliana 11 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 240.  
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distinguished by its content.”1 It forms “an exemplary basis for the consideration of the essence” of that moment 
and what it reveals about the other’s distinctiveness.2 The essential differences thus illuminate the ineffable quality 
of the self. 
 
This limitation preserves the self-other distinction. Without this element of the unknown, the experience would no 
longer belong to the observer. He would lose himself by merging with the other which would inevitably slip, as 
compeer Jean-Paul Sartre warns, into an unwieldy solipsism. 3  Rather, individuality establishes the original 
presence of the other as “the one who looks at me.”4 Stein’s mentor, Edmund Husserl, believes that this delineation 
allows us to attain a higher level of understanding where we become conscious of something greater than ourselves. 
We come face-to-face with an otherness of a completely new kind.5 In effect, it is a dialogue where another’s 
actions prompt one to assess not only that person’s state of mind, but also consider his role in this experience. 
Reality thus incorporates a multiplicity of perspectives that forge a connection between the two people. For Stein, 
empathy “is a kind of act of perceiving. . . . [It] is the experience of foreign consciousness in general.”6 No matter 
how limited, this awareness determines the structure and quality of our responses in grasping the other’s psychic 
life.7 
 
The decision to participate in this endeavor stems from an inner desire to cultivate a deep interpersonal knowledge 
and gain a fulfilling experience. This interplay contains its own type of originality which separates it from other 
means of knowing and feeling. Stein famously points out that empathy is a unique expression different from 
conventional emotions, such as joy or sorrow. Being in a class by itself, a sui generis, it is not felt as one’s own 
 
Note 14    Marianne Sawicki, Body, Text, and Science (New York: Springer Publishing,  
     1997), 97. 
Note 15    Stein, Problem of Empathy, 4. In Philosophy of Psychology and the  
     Humanities, Stein how “our glance rests in the natural attitude with everything  
     that’s in it, is a correlate of our consciousness. . . .To every object and to every  
     class of objects there correspond certain adapted coherences of      
     consciousness.” She discusses in detail how the intensity of these experiences  
     produces a stronger experience than the content seems to warrant. See Stein,  
     Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, trans. Mary Catherine  
    Baseheart and Marianne Sawicki [Washington D.C.: ICS Publications, 2000],  
    7). 
Note 16   Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological  
       Ontology, trans. H. E. Barnes (London: Routledge, 2003), 293-4. 
Note 17    Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 293. 
Note 18    Edmund Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität: Texte aus dem  
     Nachlass, vol. iii, 1921-1928, ed. Iso Kern, Husserliana 14 (The Hague:  
     Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), 442. 
Note 19    Stein, Problem of Empathy, 11. 
Note 20    Stein, Problem of Empathy, 11. 
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feeling or recollected as a past experience, but exists in the here and now, given by the other.1 Even if initiated by 
an affective reaction, the response incorporates the intellect’s divers powers, such as memory and imagination. 
These powers enable us to carry out the experience that was already co-given to us and allows us to effect an act 
that can support or accentuate the joy existent in that moment.2 It presents an opportunity to construct a fulfilling 
rapport founded upon the value of both persons. 
 
While discussing what constitutes a relational construct that gives purpose to existence is the lifeblood of 
philosophers, their ideas often remain just that—theories and postulates. Stein, however, puts into praxis her notion 
of empathy on a scale that is rarely encountered. The precision of her interpersonal understanding allows her to 
express a profound care for those in need and, in the process, betters her own person. While an academic career 
for a woman during this time would never treat her as an equal, she bolstered her dignity by dedicating herself to 
a life of charity. 3  Her altruistic drive manifests itself in her vocational choices. During World War I, she 
volunteered as a nurse for the Red Cross. And, after finding inspiration in the autobiography of St. Teresa of Avila 
years later, she joined the convent and became a nun in the Carmelite Order. Whether facing the discrimination of 
higher education hiring practices or scratching out a living as a tutor and traveling scholar, she never forsakes her 
belief in the inherent dignity of people. As illustrated most strikingly when comforting those sent to Auschwitz, 
she exercises empathy in a truly unparalleled way. 
 
Convinced that a greater good involves working with others, Stein is swept up by patriotic zeal, postpones her 
doctoral studies, and works as a nurse at an army hospital. Whether giving aid to soldiers recovering from war 
wounds or disease, she gave herself wholeheartedly to the endeavor, shying away from nothing. She writes, “I got 
the impression that the sick were not used to getting loving attention and that volunteer helpers therefore could 
find endless opportunities to show their own compassion and love of neighbor in these places of suffering.”4 In 
accord with her future philosophical views, she looked at the soldiers as not just bodies consisting of different 
 
Note 21    She writes, “Thus empathy is a kind of act of perceiving sui generis. [It] is the  
     experience of foreign consciousness in general, irrespective of the kind of  
     experiencing subject or of the subject whose consciousness is experienced”  
     (Problem of Empathy, 11). 
Note 22    Stein, Problem of Empathy, 93. 
Note 23    Although the discrimination that she faced as a woman in academe lies outside  
     the scope of this article, she addresses this problem in her lecture, “Problems  
     of Women’s Education” delivered in Münster in 1932 at  the German Institute  
     for Scientific Pedagogy. See Die Frau: Ihre Aufgabe nach Natur und Gnade in  
     Werke, vol. 5, ed. L. Gelber (Freiburg im B.: Herder, 1959), trans. Freda Mary  
     Oben as Woman (Washington: Institute of Carmelite Studies, 1987).  For a  
     critical assessment of Stein’s discussion of the inherent relation between  
     women and empathy, see Antonio Calcagno, The Philosophy of Edith Stein  
     (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2007), 63-80. 
Note 24    Edith Stein, Life in a Jewish Family: Her Unfinished Autobiographical  
     Account, trans. Josephine Koeppel (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications,  
    1989), 298. 
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parts and aspects, but at their entire person, deserving of both emotional and intellectual support. Appreciating 
their mindedness supplements the basic human need to feel connected with others. She performs her duties with a 
selflessness that prioritizes their relationship so that she does not let her response disintegrate into a maudlin 
sentiment. Her attentiveness respects the distance between their condition and her role. As a result, she was 
“equally popular with the wounded soldiers, her colleagues, and her superiors,” which ultimately contributed to 
her receiving the medal of valor.1 
 
Following the war, she returned to her studies and completed her Ph.D. in 1916. Despite graduating with the 
highest honors, she could not find gainful employment. Although no laws explicitly restricted woman from being 
hired as full-time professors, the practice in academe was to hire only men. The letter of recommendation written 
by her dissertation director, Edmund Husserl, underlines the gender barrier: “Should the academic career be opened 
to women, I could recommend her highly and warmly for approval as a university professor.”2 In fact, a woman 
would not hold a lecturer post in Philosophy at a German university until the 1950s. In order to keep abreast of the 
scholarly developments in the field, she took a position as an assistant for Husserl. In time though, this job failed 
to satisfy her yearnings to submit her own research for publication and teach.3 
 
Over the next few years, she kept active by giving private instruction, writing, and lecturing part-time. While 
staying with friends in the spring of 1921, she came across the The Autobiography of St. Teresa of Avila. She was 
so taken with the mystic’s wisdom that she read it in one night, proclaiming “This is the truth.”4 Though raised in 
a Jewish household, she had slipped into atheism during her university years (which is not an uncommon 
experience for graduate students), but these words spoke to her with such force that she elected not only to convert 
to Catholicism, but also join the same order as her spiritual exemplar. This radical decision sometimes 
overshadows her reputation as a philosopher, but this article strives to show that her religious expression is in 
many ways an extension of her higher education.5 Her scholarship in phenomenology impressed upon her the 
necessity of cultivating relationships and recognizing the interpersonal value of these lived experiences. In effect, 
it affirms her belief in humanity’s goodness and, as such, conforms to Teresa’s writings: “And be certain that the 
 
Note 25   Stein, Life, 16; for a discussion about the awarding of the medal, see Waltraud  
    Herbstrith, Edith Stein: A Biography (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1985), 53. 
Note 26   Edith Stein, Edith Stein: Letters to Roman Ingarden, trans. Hugh C. Hunt  
    (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 2014), 63. A copy of the actual letter is  
    also found on this page. 
Note 27   She writes in a letter, “Putting manuscripts in order, which was all my work  
    consisted of for months, was gradually getting to be unbearable for me, nor  
    does it seem to me to be so necessary that, for its sake, I should have to  
    renounce doing anything on my own” (Stein, Self-Portrait in Letters: 1916- 
   1942, trans. Josephine Koeppel [Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1993],  
    23). 
Note 28   Josephine Koeppel, Edith Stein: Philosopher and Mystic (Collegeville, MN:  
    The Liturgical Press, 1990). 
Note 29   Calcagno notes that the majority of scholars who study Stein direct their  
    attention to her biographical and religious writings. See Antonio Calcagno,  
    “Assistant and/or Collaborator?” 263. 
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more advanced you see you are in love for your neighbor the more advanced you will be in the love of God, for 
the love His Majesty has for us is so great that to repay us for our love of neighbor He will in a thousand ways 
increase the love we have for Him.”1 When properly executed, an attentiveness to another’s condition displays a 
genuine affection that underscores our need for one another. It complements the Christian principle that love for 
our neighbor belongs to necessary ethics, for it is necessarily related to our love for God. In other words, a 
fundamental love for God means that we cannot but love our neighbor as well. 
 
For Stein, cultivating an interior life opened up an entirely new world to her. In a letter to colleague, she describes 
this awakening, “All prior realities become transparent; the genuine sustaining and motivating strengths become 
perceptible. Previous conflicts become trivial!”2 This realization fortifies her conviction to put into praxis her 
learning in a personal, practical way. While excluded from the stations of academe, she found inclusion in a faith 
that encouraged her to utilize her philosophical learning to grasp the thought process of another and use this 
knowledge to deepen their rapport. While her empathetic link first centered upon God, it expanded outwards to 
include those open to her compassion. Taking the necessary steps to align one’s will with the divine produces a 
deep-seated affection for all of creation and, in turn, loving one’s neighbor inculcates a devout conviction in our 
inherent goodness. Stein’s scholarly works may have explicated empathy’s operation, but it did not assert the need 
to engender a positive flow. For example, an observer could apprehend the other’s mental states via their 
interaction, and choose to use this knowledge for selfish purposes, such as ascertaining the other’s motivations 
solely to manipulate him for personal gain. With this epiphany, Stein now makes every effort in her daily life to 
make certain that her empathy generates not only a keen insight into that person’s well-being, but also an authentic 
commitment to their innate worth. Fellow Carmelite Sister Maria Amata Neyer remarks, “It was ‘the truth of 
things,’ the ‘things themselves,’ the objects. Now in Teresa of Avila she was filled with the truth of love that is 
not knowledge, but relationship.”3 Being attuned to this saint’s wisdom helps her realize that a valued life does not 
stem from patiently heeding custom’s dictates or the prevailing prejudices of her time, but from recognizing her 
own value. By directing her energies to apprehend the divine’s state of being—no matter how limited this endeavor 
may be—she strengthens her faith and, in turn, enriches her very self. She sees first-hand that God neither 
discriminates nor denigrates. As a result, she concludes, “I found the place where there is rest and peace for all 
restless hearts.”4 
 
Here, she sharpens her focus by structuring her thoughts and feelings to correspond with the divine’s will. This 
connection, however, must draw a bold line of demarcation between what He offers and what she can do. While 
His knowledge “is not mistaken about people’s experiences. . , [her] experiences do not become God’s own, 
either.”5 A self-other distinction validates the uniqueness of each one’s perception. Some people may facially 
believe that losing themselves within the divine increases spiritual awareness, but they run the risk of ignoring the 
fact that His essence is pure and their person is not. In Christian thought, we must be conscious of our dependence 
upon His grace. Not everyone is bound to conform to the divine will in willing those things because not everyone 
is obliged to know everything willed by the divine will. Moreover, we are not obliged to fulfill the affirmative 
divine precepts. This choice rests upon our resolve to pursue this end. It requires a diligence in mirroring the 
infinitude of His love to fashion a steadfast bond. It is not for the weak-minded or self-centered. Teresa recollects 
 
Note 30   Teresa of Avila, Interior Castle, Bk.5.3.8, trans. Kieran Kavanaugh and Otilio  
    Rodriguez (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1979), 100.  
Note 31   Stein, Letters to Roman Ingarden, 259. This letter is written on November 8,  
    1927. 
Note 32   Maria Amata Neyer, Edith Stein: Her Life in Photos and Documents  
    (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1999), 34.  
Note 33   Stein, Self-Portrait in Letters, 47. 
Note 34   Stein, Problem of Empathy, 11. 
Journal of Philosophy, Culture and Religion                                                                                                                                     www.iiste.org 




the labor-intensive nature of conforming herself to His will, “I threw myself on the ground beside it, my tears 
flowing plenteously, and implored Him to strengthen me once for all, so that I might never offend Him anymore.”1 
 
Through contemplation, God is given to her as an object that bears psychological states.2 A cognizance of what 
He offers, therefore, supplants the use of facial expressions and bodily gestures as the primary phenomena to 
consider when structuring an empathetic encounter. One particular advantage of structuring one’s life upon His 
will is the continuous opportunities to experience true goodness. The resultant bond transcends a simple affective 
response. It allows her to see the divine as a wholly distinct being, for He is not susceptible to those intellectual 
constraints limiting a human purview. Subsequently, she refines her ability to express herself in a way that fosters 
charity and selflessness. The core of their connection thus stems from the radical otherness of God, and accounts 
for why Stein states that “it is not something about which I can ‘report’ in a letter.”3 Reality becomes founded 
upon the divine’s presence. By directly apprehending His immediacy, she does not have to infer His existence. 
She knows Him intimately. His transcendence, however, preserves their asymmetry. As Emmanuel Lévinas writes, 
“If one could possess, grasp, and know the other, it would not be other.”4 Embracing the goodness that flows 
through Him constructs a substantive relationship that supersedes those limitations affecting the depth of our 
understanding. Overcoming these obstacles produces a dynamic intersubjectivity that distinguishes Stein’s sense 
of self and emboldens her willingness to adopt another’s perspective.5 
 
The disparate experiences between working for Husserl and reading Teresa of Avila’s revelations bring to light 
markedly different perceptions of assessing her value. In the case of the former, she is a person whose scholarly 
worth remains underappreciated because of her gender. For the latter, she is a dedicated novitiate whose conviction 
in a higher truth promises greatness. In order to realize this potential, she conjoins her intellectual achievements 
with faith-inspired beliefs to master a keen awareness of the divine. The first step rests upon situating herself in a 
position that gives her the most direct means to put into practice her beliefs. Upon converting to and receiving the 
sacraments in the Catholic faith, she takes up a teaching position at a school run by the Dominican sisters in Speyer, 
Germany. Here, she follows the path outlined by Teresa. Living in a room adjacent to the nuns, she joined them 
in daily mass and structured prayer. She writes that “living behind the sheltering walls of a convent, at heart—and 
this I may surely say without any presumption—like a real nun, even though I wear no veil and am not bound by 
vows or enclosure.” 6  Despite the clarity of Teresa’s example, she does not presume that becoming a nun 
necessarily results in a virtuous empathy. Conscious of the inherent challenges of accessing the divine, she 
postpones her vows so that she can discern her readiness. This act alone demonstrates a heightened appreciation 
for the selfless commitment in focusing her attention upon God. 
 
While her response to Teresa may spark the epiphany, the force of her choice to emulate Teresa’s thoughts and 
actions stem from will. In Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, Stein discusses how the will presupposes 
a certain aliveness as well as an objective basis including direction-giving motives. Through these two inclinations, 
it generates its power from itself and spontaneously draws from “the lifesphere.”7 She accords the will a freedom 
distinct from the intellect’s dictates. It “harbors an impulse as a core within itself” and draws from this “lifepower” 
 
Note 35   Teresa of Avila, The Autobiography of St. Teresa of Avila, trans. David Lewis  
    (Rockford, IL: Tan, 1997), 65. 
Note 36   Stein, Problem of Empathy, 5-6. 
Note 37   Stein, Self-Portrait in Letters, 47. 
Note 38   Emmanuel Lévinas, Time and the Other, trans. R. A. Cohen (Pittsburgh:  
    Duquesne University Press, 1987), 90. 
Note 39   Edmund Husserl stress that one’s personhood is intersubjectively constituted.  
    See Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität, 14:175. 
Note 40   Stein, Self-Portrait in Letters, 47. 
Note 41   Stein, Philosophy of Psychology, 87-90. 
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to initiate action.1 Moreover, she does not assign it a teleological orientation. The will does not have to pursue an 
end perceived as an unqualified good. If it were to necessarily seek happiness, then it would necessarily force the 
intellect to continually consider happiness, which is false. An ethically sound act thus depends upon the free will 
targeting an object which right reason judges to be meritorious. This view, however, does not mean that an 
empathetic act must be virtuous. One can choose to conform oneself with a person who does not act morally sound. 
Of course, in the context of drawing closer to God, the will directs us towards recognizing that the life of grace 
flows into us because by our very nature we are related to the divine. We are capable of receiving into ourselves 
His divine life, for “this linkage between head and members has a threefold foundation. It rests upon nature, 
freedom, and grace.”2 Consequently, choosing to coordinate our perception with the divine’s font of goodness 
fulfills the essence of our nature. It is a process that perfects our humanness. 
 
After ten years of working and praying alongside the nuns, Stein elects to enter into the same order as her exemplar. 
She becomes a Carmelite novice in 1934 and takes her first vows a year later. While she continued writing, which 
included a family history and a philosophical work that examined Catholic tradition through the lens of 
phenomenology, she learned how to become more attuned to the subtle expressions of divine care found in this 
world.3 By caring out her duties faithfully, she comes to realize how the interactions with her fellow sisters brought 
“a source of deep peace and hearty joyousness and a fountain of grace that bubbles over everything.”4 Mirroring 
the same kinds of joys emanating from the divine confirms a mutual intimacy because she can now share them 
with the beloved. It allows her to ascribe and reflect on the real intentions of what constitutes the divine. 
 
While some may believe that empathizing with God is a futile endeavor since He is perfect and we are not, but 
such a view ignores the elemental connection between God and creation. The kind of empiricism that is possible 
may not satisfy a skeptical observer, but the sense of wholeness engendered by being attuned to His goodness 
enhances one’s humanness. We are conscious living beings. That we can align our minds with the divine will and 
participate in these experiences provides certitude about His goodness. Stein refers to this awareness as “the zero 
point of orientation.”5 From here, one becomes aware of one’s own body in relation to the other, which engenders 
a new, higher order of empathy that one can perform. As Kris McDaniel explains, it is “through the higher-order 
empathetic act that I come to recognize myself as a physical object imbued with psychological states. Not only 
must I have empathy but there must also be other people who have empathy in order for me to have this kind of 
self-knowledge.”6 Therefore, an informed connection with God shows that each person possesses the means to 
cultivate a mutual intimacy. A true knowing enables us to embrace another’s perspective and better our self-
understanding. 
 
Note 42   Stein, Philosophy of Psychology, 87. 
Note 43   Stein, Finite and Eternal Being, 523 
Note 44   The former is entitled, Life in a Jewish Family: Her Unfinished  
    Autobiographical Account, ed. L. Gelber and Romaeus Leuven, trans.  
    Josephine Koeppel (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1986); the latter is  
    Potency and Act, trans. Walter Redmond (Washington, D.C: ICS Publications,  
    2009). 
Note 45   Edith Stein, The Hidden Life, trans. Waltraut Stein (Washington D.C.: ICS  
    Publications, 1992), 6. 
Note 46   Stein, Problem of Empathy, 43. 
Note 47    Kris McDaniel, “Edith Stein: On the Problem of Empathy,” in Ten Neglected  
    Philosophical Classics, ed. Eric Schliessen (Oxford: Oxford University Press,  
    2017), 218. 
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No matter how strong or informed this embrace can become, Stein consistently stresses the delineation between 
the parties: “two subjects are separate and not joined together . . . by a consciousness of sameness or a continuity 
of experience.”1 For her and Husserl, empathy is an act of perceiving; it is the experience of foreign consciousness. 
No matter how much the observer ascertains, he can never fully appreciate the originality of the other’s experience. 
If that occurred, then his being would be subsumed by the other, forsaking its uniqueness. Rather, he acknowledges 
it as an experience lived through by another. The experiences that Stein seeks are those that empower her to grasp 
His will more accurately and assuredly. And, the manner in which she achieves this goal is by extending a similar 
attentiveness and affection for those whose faith is attacked and dignity denigrated. 
 
On the surface, leading the life of a cloistered nun seems counterintuitive to her actively engage others and immerse 
herself in this experience. As opposed to the Franciscans or Dominicans who lead itinerant lives, preaching and 
teaching, the Carmelites separate themselves from the world around them dedicating themselves to a life of prayer. 
If she believed so strongly in advancing her awareness of the divine via assisting others, then she could have joined 
an order that actively seeks to aid the less fortunate. Yet, such a view misunderstands the expression of empathy. 
Interactions may become more limited, but this does not diminish the care invested in appreciating her fellow 
sisters’ well-being. In Freda Oben’s biography which records the accounts of the nuns who lived with her, she 
relates, “I have heard that Edith had a special gift for relating to people. She intuitively felt the state of mind of 
others and knew what they needed and how to encourage them. Her love and goodness were natural.”2 The 
conviction in another’s virtue sharpened her focus and inspired her actions. Ultimately, location does not determine 
the efficacy of extending oneself to others as much as a yearning to strike a harmonious connection. 
 
This realization drives Stein forward as she makes her final vows four years later on April 21, 1938. Adopting the 
name, Sister Teresa Benedicta of the Cross, she takes her place in the Cologne monastery. Here she aspires to 
achieve a wholeness that betters her very being and, in turn, those who come in contact with her. The goodness 
drawn from this connection does not depend upon constant reassurance, for such a need lies in the realm of the 
sublunary lover, but stems from a higher, more transcendent understanding of what defines the self. She writes, 
“The formation of an unshakable bond with all whom life brings in my way, a bond in no way dependent on day-
to-day contact, is a significant element in my life.”3 The standard of measurement revolves around grasping 
another’s needs and spiritual desires rather than prevailing notions of what defines success. Its strength derives 
from the honesty exchanged between them. The resultant trust and shared understanding empowers her to empty 
herself of any material or worldly concerns, allowing her to become open to the other’s situation. 
 
Despite the honesty underpinning the fulfillment she seeks, it has no bearing upon the political movements shaping 
German society. In January of 1931, Adolph Hitler assumed power as chancellor of Germany and two months 
later, the first concentration camp opened in Dachau. Fearing that the growing anti-Semitism would endanger the 
convent, she transferred to the Echt convent in Holland. Yet, when the Dutch bishops of occupied Holland wrote 
a letter condemning the pogroms and deportation of Jews (July 26, 1942), Hitler retaliated by ordering the arrest 
of all non-Aryan Roman Catholics. Stein was seized by the Gestapo on August 2. She and her sister Rosa, who 
had also converted and was serving at the Echt Convent, joined many other Jewish Christians as they were taken 
to a transit camp in Amersfoort and then to Westerbork. 
 
A young detainee, Etty Hillesum, who was at the camp when Edith and her sister arrived, left behind a journal 
describing Westerbork’s appearance when getting off the train: “Suddenly there was a village of wooden barracks, 
set between the heath and sky, with a glaringly yellow lupin field in the middle and barbed wire all around. And 
there were human lives as well, thick as flies. . . .There is mud, so much mud that somewhere between your ribs 
you need to have a great deal of inner sunshine if you don’t want to become the psychological victim of it all.”4 
 
Note 48   Stein, Problem of Empathy, 10-11. 
Note 49   Freda Mary Oben, Edith Stein: Scholar, Feminist, Saint (Staten Island: Alba  
    House, 1988), 29. 
Note 50    Stein, Self-Portrait in Letters, 46. 
Note 51    Etty Hillesum, An Interrupted Life: The Diaries, 1941-1943 and Letters from  
     Westerbork, (New York: Henry Holt, 1996), 242.  
Journal of Philosophy, Culture and Religion                                                                                                                                     www.iiste.org 




Its grim desolation would certainly undo one’s surety of self, undermining the belief in humanity’s goodness. Yet, 
Stein held fast to her conviction that the relation between the individual and other are inviolate. Understanding 
that her connection with God extolled the dignity of being human, she saw her purpose in empathizing with those 
in need. This action supplemented her own relation with the divine, allowing her to realize her potential. “Helping 
Christ carry his cross fills one with a strong and pure joy, and those who may and can do so, the builders of God’s 
kingdom, are the most authentic children of God.”1 Yet, being empathetic involves more than simply being 
sensitive to another’s plight. One must be willing to withstand whatever outside pressures seek to upset the bond 
between people. She privileges this bond above all else, for through this interpersonal knowing, she becomes more 
fully aware of the divine offers and what she values.2 It epitomizes the type of person whom she has chosen to be. 
The depth of her understanding comes to light when she comforts the women and children in the camp. Julius 
Marcan, a survivor who was there at the same time, marks how Stein resisted the dehumanizing effects of this 
environ and how she stayed true to her heart: 
 
It was Edith Stein’s complete calm and self-possession that marked her out from the rest of the prisoners. There 
was a spirit of indescribable misery in the camp; the new prisoners, especially, suffered from extreme anxiety. 
Edith Stein went among the women like an angel, comforting, helping and consoling them. Many of the mothers 
were on the brink of insanity and had sat moaning for days, without giving any thought to their children. Edith 
Stein immediately set about taking care of these little ones. She washed them, combed their hair and tried to make 
sure they were fed and cared for.3 
 
Unlike her time in World War I, she had no medications to dispense or blankets to comfort them. She had only 
herself to give. But, like her service as a Red Cross nurse, her attentiveness instilled in others a firm conviction in 
their personal worth. She never lost her sense of self or desire to enrich this connection. She gave all that she could 
to help them understand that goodness did exist, that a belief in others was not a misplaced ideal or illusion. Her 
concern transcended their immediate surroundings. Establishing a substantive connection—regardless of how brief 
it may be—exercises not only a mental acuity, but also displays the volition to express such a conscientious care. 
The Dutch official Wielek who also spent time with her in Westerbork noted her composure and the care emanating 
from her actions: “For a couple of days she lived in that hellhole, walking, talking and praying…like a saint. And 
she really was one. That is the only fitting way to describe this middle-aged woman who struck everyone as so 
young, who was so whole and honest and genuine.”4 
 
Within a few days, she and Rosa were placed on a train to Auschwitz, but they never entered its barracks because 
they were immediately deemed incapable for work and sent directly to the gas chambers. Though powerless to 
change its outcome, she chose to not let the circumstances undermine her capacity to grasp another’s thoughts and 
feelings and use this knowledge to express a much-desired respect for their person. While her academic treatises 
present a blueprint of how to align her person with another’s, her choices champion the imperative to put into 
praxis this knowledge. She embodies empathy’s fundamental tenets. Whether referring to her as an exemplar of 
spiritual understanding or earnest scholar, her actions show that being attentive to others betters the world around 
them. 
 
Being a part of these situations and sensations reveals a spectrum of interpersonal understanding that affirms the 
value of being human and the power of the body to convey this knowledge. She is not confined to a solipsistic 
 
Note 52    Stein, Hidden Life, 93. 
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view of the world, but sees in others a truth that revolutionizes the value of experience. It apotheosizes the self in 
all its glory and limitations. A consciousness of others and embracing the harsh conditions that they live in provide 
a chance to hone her intrinsic goodness. She shuns the attitude that she should detach herself from this reality and 
instead inserts herself within this interpersonal dynamic. Regardless of how abhorrent or dangerous the world 
becomes, she gives this reality her rapt attention. The desire to perfect this kind of knowledge drives her onward 
to become more than a philosophic onlooker upon an objective reality. Canonized by Pope John Paul II on October 
11, 1998, Stein’s difficulties may occur at a time and place far different from the one we live in, but her actions 
convey how best to put into praxis those truths underpinning our humanness and become a paragon for others. 
 
Future Research 
Stein’s example establishes the applicability of phenomenology to actual situations and people. For future research, 
her concept of empathy should not be seen only as a means to access another’s perspective, but also to understand 
others as persons who possess an innate worth. In this respect, her example can serve as a crucial means to 
understand communal experiences. Exploring empathy’s connection to values and sociality will further establish 
the imperative to put it into praxis. 
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